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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
S'I'ATE OF UTAH, by and Through
Its ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs..JACK C. JENSEN and MEREA W.
.JENSEN, his Wife, and INTER:HOUNTAIN HOLDING
CU~fPANY,

Defenda1nts-Appellarn.ts.

t

Case
No.11387

\

BRIEF O,F RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case is one in condemnation brought by the
Highway Commission for highway purposes.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
'rhe case was tried the first time by Tom Plattis, attornc~" for the State of Utah. At the conclusion of trial,
t!H· Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson granted the state a
110w trial.
The case was retried before the Honorable
Lc•o11arcl W. Elton with George E. Bridwell, Special
\:-:sistant Attorney General representing the state in the
1

second trial. Appellants appeal from Judge Jeppson 'R
order granting a new trial and from the judgment of the
verdict rendered as a result of the second trial.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent contends that the rulings of the court
below are correct and should be sustained.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees that the statement of facts contained in appellants' brief is substantially correct. The
following additional facts are presented for clarification.
On August 9, 1955, the Utah State Road Commission
entered into a contract with American Smelting and Refining Company for the purchase of 4.94 acres of land
for highway purposes. American Smelting and Refining
Company agreed to convey 4.94 acres of land and all of
their rights of egress to or from their remaining land except one twenty-foot opening. The State Road Commission of Utah agreed to pay $4000 for the 4.94 acres and
to construct an approach to the twenty-foot opening.
(R-36.)
There is no need to second guess the reasons why
the approach road was not constructed since all that matters was the fact that the State of Utah, by and through
its Road Commission, paid appellants $6750, plus interest for respondent's failure to construct an approach
road. (R-208, 93.)

On September 13, 1967, the first trial commenced on
one issue, namely: the value of the difference in appellant's land with one twenty-foot opening and without
the twenty-foot opening. (R-50.)
After judgment on the jury verdict, respondent
m(wed for a new trial. The lower court denied the motion on condition that appellants remit the sum of $4,250
from the verdict of $16,250, leaving a net judgment of
$12,001.00. (R-124, 125.)
After the order was signed and entered, one of the
attorneys for appellants who was not present at the time
set for argument had a further order signed by the trial
jrn1ge ex parte on November 29, 1967. (R-126, 127.) Respondents then moved for an order granting a new trial
anc1 to vacate the order signed by the trial judge on November 29, 1967. (R-128, 129.) After hearing the matter
the trial court vacated the order and granted a new trial.
(R-130.)
Thereafter a new trial was commenced on June 3,
1968, George E. Bridwell, special assistant attorney general, then representing the state.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT MAY GRANT A NEW
TRIAL ON GROUNDS OF EXCESSIVE DAMAGES EVEN THOUGH JURY VERDICT IS
SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
Appellant's Point I presupposes that a trial court
('a1mot grant a motion for a new trial on grounds that

the verdict is excessive and not justified by the evidence
when the verdict is within the limits of the testimony.
Such is not the law nor can support for such contention
be found. On the contrary, in Wellman v. N able, 12 Utah
2d 350, 366 P .2d 701 ( 1961), this court rejected the argument proposed by appellant at 703:
"The mere fact that the jury verdict is supported
hy substantial evidence sufficient to make a pri/)/a
facie case and furnish a reasonable basis for their
decision does not require that the trial court's order granting a new trial should be reversed. Thi~
is especially true where the order for the new trial
is based on the amount of the verdict.''
Again in King v. Union Pac. R. Co., 117 Utah 40, 212
P.2d 692 (1949), the Court stated at 698:
''The defendant's contention that a trial judge in
most cases should not grant a new trial when th~
verdict is supported by substantial competent
evidence cannot find support in the authorities."
One good reason for the rule is shown to exist in the
case at bar, where it is clearly demonstrated how the jury
arrived at its verdict of $16,250.
It ·was stipulated and the jury ·was so instructed,
that the \'alue of the land area taken was $1.00 (R. 94),
and the right of appellants to have an approach road
built was settled for $6750. (R. 93.) It was also stipulated that the construction of the approach road would
cost $23,000. ( R. 411.) Throughout the trial the fignrcR of
$6750 and $23,000 were before the jury. At one point the
lo\ver court instructed the jury that the $6750 \nlS to he
4

,·ow.;iclerecl by them as a partial payment. (R. 378.) It
took little imagination to show that the jury subtracted
$G7:-JO from $23,000 in arriving at their verdict of $16,250.
'rhere can be no doubt but that the lower court took
thcsr facts into consideration when it granted respond~nts' motion for a new trial.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
In points I and II of appellants' brief seeking to re1·iew the trial court's order granting a new trial, this

ronrt is limited to one determination, which is: Was such
au order an abuse of judicial discretion. State v. Chrislrnsen, 13 Utah 2d 224, 371 P.2d 552 (1962); Paul v. Kirkendrdl, 1 Utah 2d 1, 261 P.2d 670 (1953); Duffy v. Union
Pac. R. Co., 118 Utah 82, 218 P.2d 1080 (1950).
Respondent's motion for a new trial contained seven
points of error, all of which were argued by respondent
at the time set for hearing (R. 119-120). The trial court
;;rant eel the motion on the ground "that the verdict of
$16,250 is excessive and not justified for want of sufficient
1·\·illence and appears to be given under the influence of
p11ssion and prejudice" (R. 124-125, 130) while respondrnt believes that the single ground used by the trial court
is sufficient, this court can sustained the order granting
a new trial on any ground which was presented. Worthi 1111f ou v. Caldwell, 65 ·wash. 2d 269, 396 P.2d 797 (1964);
5

5 AM. Jur. 2d Appeal & Error §850 (1962). See also
Stack v. Kearnes, 118 Utah 237, 221 P.2d 594 (1950)
wherein this court had to assume the ground the lower
court relied on.
Motions for new trial are addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and the judgment of the lower cort
should only be reversed where there has been plain abuse
of discretion, Bowden v. Denver & Rio Grande Wester11
Railroad Co., 3 Utah 2d 444, 286 P.2cl 240 (1955); Burto11
v. Zion's Co-op Mercantile Institution, 122 Utah 360, 249
P.2d 514 (1952); Marshall v .Ogden Ry. & Depot Co., 118
Utah 161, 221 P.2d 868 (1950), but whether granted or ,
denied, the discretion of the trial court will be presumed
to have been properly exercised unless abuse is clearly
shown. Moser v. Zion's Co-op Jiil ercantile Institution,
114 Utah 58, 197 P.2d 136 (1948); Lehi Irr. Co. v. M.oyle.
4 Utah 327, 9 Pac. 867 (1886). Nothing in the record or
in appellants' brief indicates that there was any abuse of
discretion whatever.
In order to put this appeal in its proper perspective,
it is necessary to point out that this is not a case \Yhcre
the trial cort denied a motion for n new trial but rather
where the trial court, having seen and heard the witness
and presided over the jury, granted a new trial. BecauRe
of this fact a stronger showing of abuse of discretion will
ordinarily be required to set aside an order granting ti
new trial than to srt aside a11 order denying a new trinl.
Hrortlii11gto11 v. Cald11·ell, supra.

(j

Further, this court has laid down the rule that it
will be slow to interfere with a ruling of lower court
granting or denying a new trial on questions pertaining
to damages, Page v. Utah Home Fire Lns. Co., 15 Utah
2do 257 (1964) ; Paul v. Kirkendall, supra, (1953); Mitchrll v. Arrowhead Freight Lines, 117 Utah 224, 214 P.2d
020 (1950); Moser v. Zion's Co-op Mercantile Institution,
supra 1949; Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 105 P.2d 176
(1940); Chatelain v. Thackeray, 98 Utah 525, 100 P.2d
191 (1940). This is so because the trial judge who saw
and beard the witness and observed the reaction of the
jury is much better able to determine the question of
t•xccssiveness or prejudice, State v. Christensen, supra
(1962), and this court should not substitute its discretion
for that of the trial court. Moser v. Zion's Co-op Merrantile Institution, supra ( 1948).

It is respondent's contention that the trial court
properly exercised its discretion in granting a new trial
tn that there was substantial conflict of evidence on the
only issue in the case. Nor is there need that the evideuce be uncontroverted in favor of the moving party.
In King v Union Pac. R. Co., supra (1949) this court
stated at 698:
"We cannot agree with the trial judge that
the evidence is 'uncontroverted' in the two respects mentioned by him in his decision. However, as has been pointed out, it is not necessary
that the evidence be uncontroverted in favor of
the moving party before the trial court can grant
a new trial. The evidence in the instant case as
to the two particulars mentioned by the trial
judge is conflicting and there does appear in the

7

record substantial competent evidence whid1
would support a verdict for the plaintiff. Nothing more need appear. The defendant docs not
contend that the jury could not have reasonahly
found for the plaintiff.''

It has been held by this court that all that nce<ls to
appear in the record is competent evidence which would
support a verdict in favor of the party moving for a new
trial. In reaffirming the King case this court in Stack "·
Kearnes, supra (1950) stated at 243:
''Assuming that the trial court grantc(1 the
new trial on the ground that the evidence was
insufficient to justify the verdict, as contenclec1 liy '
the defendant, the court did not abuse its discretion in so doing. In the recent case of King Y.
Union Pacific Railroad Co., 117 Utah 40, 212 P.2c1
602, \Ve had occasion to determine the breadth of
a trial court's discretion in granting a new trial
upon that ground. After reviewing numerom
cases from California and Oklahoma, as well a::
former decisions of this Court, in which trial
courts had granted new trials upon the aforementioned ground, we held that \Yhcre there appears
in the record competent evidence which would
support a verdict in favor of the party moving for
a new trial, there is no abuse of discretion 011 th~
part of the trial court in granting a new trial
upon that ground.''
\Vhere conflict of evidence arises, this court has rl'pea tcdly held that it will not review the discretion exercised by the trial court in granting a new trial. fTJJfO!l' 11
Appliance a111l Radio Co. Y. Flint, 122 Utah 298, 249
P.2rl 82G (1932); Williams v. O.r;den U11io11 Ry. and !Jc1iul
Co., 110 Utal1 520, 230 P.2d :113 (1%1); King v. [T11iu11
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f!ac. R. Co., supra (1949); Utah State Nat. Barnk v. Livingston, 69 Utah 284, 254 Pac. 781 (1927); Davis v. Utah
Houthern R. Co., 3 Utah 218, 2 Pac. 521 (1883). The
rnle is well stated in King v. Urvion Pac. R. Co., supra
(1949) at 695:
"In one of its earliest cases this court announced that where the testimony is conflicting,
the granting or refusing of a new trial rests peculiarly within the discretion of the trial court.
Newton v. Brown, 2 Utah 126. A short time later
in Davis v. Utah Southern R. Co., 3 Utah 218, 2
P.521, we similarly stated that where there is a
substantial conflict of evidence on a material issue, we will not review the discretion exercised by
the trial court in granting a new trial. Again in
Utah State Nat. Bank v. Livingston, 69 Utah 284,
254 P.281, this court applied the same rule and
upheld a trial court which had granted a new trial
where the evidence was conflicting upon an essential issue of the case. Thompson v. Brown Live
Stock Co., 74 Utah 1, 276 P. 651, accord."
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANTS
A NEW TRIAL AT THE END OF THE SECOND TRIAL OF THIS MATTER.
Appellants take the position that simply because one
juror stated upon polling that he had not yet made up
Iii:,; mind that there was improper deliberation.
Rule 47(q), URCP provides that a verdict is reached
when three-fourths of the jury have agreed upon averiliet. Such was the case here and it cannot be denied.
9

The Wyoming case of Glover v. Berger set forth by
appellants is a nonsequitor as far as reaching this point
is concerned.
CONCLUSION
The decisions reached by trial court at the first
trial and the retrial were proper and should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE E. BRIDWELL
Special Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondents
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